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TOURO LAWREVIEW
prove that the secondary evidence should have been admitted.83
As long as New York allows police to conduct warrantless
searches and seizures, a New York court must demonstrate that
its decision is based solely on a state constitutional provision to be
immune from review by the Supreme Court.84
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. LaFontaine8 5
(decided November 6, 1997)
Defendant, Sixto LaFontaine, was indicted for criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.86 The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence87 seized by New Jersey
police officers arguing that the officers lacked authority to make
the arrest."8 Moreover, defendant claimed that his arrest violated
83 Id. at 88, 681 N.E.2d. at 356, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 189. "[B]y invoking a
state constitutional provision, a state court immunizes its decision from review
by this Court." Id.
84 Payton, 445 U.S. at 600."
85 235 A.D.2d 93, 664 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1st Dep't), appeal granted, 91
N.Y.2d 883, 691 N.E.2d 654, 668 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1997).
86Id. at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
87 See N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 710.20 (McKinney 1997). This section
provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion of a defendant who (a) is aggrieved by unlawful
or improper acquisition of evidence and has reasonable cause
to believe that such may be offered against him in a criminal
action... a court may, under circumstances prescribed in
this article, order that such evidence be suppressed or
excluded upon the ground that it: (1) Consists of tangible
property obtained by means of an unlawful search and
seizure under circumstances precluding admissibility thereof
in a criminal action against such defendant.
Id.
88 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
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his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as
guaranteed under the United States Constitution and the New
York State Constitution.9°  The Appellate Division, First
Department affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that
the only violation committed was statutory and not constitutional;
therefore, suppression of the evidence was not mandated and the
search and seizure was lawful.9'
Defendant, Sixto LaFontaine, and Miguel Ortiz were wanted
for the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder92 and aggravated
assault? in the State of New Jersey.9 Additionally, defendant
89 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... " Id.
9' LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589. See N.Y. CONST.
art. I, §12. This section provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause...." Id.
91LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93.
92 Id. at 94, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2 (West
1997). This section provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or
persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting
or facilitating its commission he: (1) Agrees with such other
person or persons that they or one or more of them will
engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt
or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) Agrees to aid
such other person or persons in the planning or commission
of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such
crime.
Id. Conspiracy to commit murder is a crime of the second degree that may be
punishable by a prison term of five to ten years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6
(West 1997).
93 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)(1) (West 1997). This section provides
in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) Attempts
to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or
knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life recklessly causes such injury." Id. Aggravated assault is
a crime of the second degree and one who is convicted of this crime can be
faced with the same sentencing exposure as one who is convicted for
1998 1179
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was sought by the New Jersey Federal District Court for the
federal offense of flight to avoid prosecution.95 A New Jersey
warrant was issued by the Municipal Court of Patterson, New
Jersey and a federal warrant was issued by the New Jersey
Federal District Court.' On November 18, 1992, four New
Jersey Police officers went to the 34th precinct in New York City
to execute the arrest warrants. 97  Four New York police
detectives joined the New Jersey officers in an unsuccessful
search for the suspects.98 Thereafter, the New Jersey officers
continued the search on their own.99 During their search, the
police officers were led by an informant to an apartment located
at 600 West 163rd Street.'0' Two of the New Jersey police
officers went to the door, one officer waited in the hall and the
other officer waited on the fire escape landing.' The two
officers knocked on the door and identified themselves as the
conspiracy to commit murder. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (a)(2) (West
1997).
94 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 94, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
95 Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1997). This section provides in pertinent
part:
Whoever moves or travels in interstate or foreign commerce
with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or custody or
confinement after conviction, under the laws of the place
from which he flees, for a crime, or an attempt to commit a
crime, punishable by death or which is a felony under the
laws of such place from which the fugitive flees ... shall be
fined [under this title] or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
Id.
96 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 94, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
97 Id. The New Jersey police officers advised the precinct detectives that
they had information that the defendant and Miguel Ortiz had been seen within
the boundaries of the 34th precinct, in the vicinity of 158th Street between
Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway. Id. at 101, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Tom,
J., dissenting).
9 8 Id. (Tom, J., dissenting).
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police.0' At first, the officers heard "shuffling" sounds inside
the apartment; they then heard the other officers each yell
"halt."' 0 3 The defendant was apprehended on the fire escape.', °
The officers escorted the defendant back into his kitchen where
they observed and eventually seized plastic bags of cocaine which
were clearly visible on top of the refrigerator.'o The defendant
and the narcotics were turned over to the New York police
officers at the 34th Precinct. 06  Ultimately, defendant was
indicted by a New York grand jury for criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree" and of criminal use of
drug paraphernalia in the second degree.103
12 Id .
103 Id. Defendant, shirtless, was exiting through a window onto the fire
escape where he was apprehended by one of the police officers. Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. The officers heard a child crying in the apartment and returned to the
apartment with the defendant to see if the child was properly attended to. Id.
106 Id. at 102, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Tom. J., dissenting). The New Jersey
officers searched the defendant's apartment for Miguel Ortiz, however, they
were unable to locate him therein. Id. (Tom. J., dissenting). See People v.
LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d 751, 755, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 663 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1993).
107 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.16(l) (McKinney 1997). This section
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly and unlawfully
possesses... a narcotic drug with intent to sell it." Id. See also N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 220.16(12) (McKinney 1997). This section provides in pertinent part:
"A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third
degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses . . . one or more
preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing a narcotic drug
and said preparations . . . are of an aggregate weight of one-half ounce or
more." Id.
108 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 755, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 663. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 220.50 (McKinney 1997). This section provides in pertinent
part:
A person is guilty of criminally using drug paraphernalia in
the second degree when he knowingly possesses or sells ...
[d]iluents, dilutants or adulterants ... or any other material
suitable for the packaging of individual quantities of narcotic
drugs or stimulants under circumstances evincing an intent to
1998 1181
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Defendant moved in Supreme Court, New York County, to
suppress the physical evidence recovered by the New Jersey
police officers.'O°  He claimed that he had been unlawfully
arrested in New York City by New Jersey police officers who did
not have any authority beyond the New Jersey territorial limits to
make arrests in the State of New York."0 Moreover, he argued
that the seizure of the narcotics by the New Jersey police officers
was illegal and that such evidence should be excluded from his
trial."' Conversely, the People averred that as private citizens,
the police officers were entitled to arrest the defendant."
2
Additionally, the People argued that the police officers were
acting as agents of the New York City Police Department
triggering application of the Fourth Amendment "state action"
use, or under circumstances evincing knowledge that some
person intends to use, the same for the purpose of unlawfully
manufacturing, packaging or dispensing of any narcotic drug
or stimulant.
Id.
1o9 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 753, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
110 Id.
I' Id.
1 2 Id. See N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1997). This section
provides:
1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, any person
may arrest another person (a) for a felony when the latter
has in fact committed such felony, and (b) for any offense
when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his
presence. 2. Such an arrest, if for a felony, may be made
anywhere in the state. If the arrest is for an offense other
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principle.113  Finally, the People claimed that the seizure of the
narcotics was justified pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine." 4
The Supreme Court, New York County, denied defendant's
motion and held that although the New Jersey officers had the
power to make citizen arrests in New York State," 5 "they did not
do so here because they had invoked their official authority in
113 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 756, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 664. See People v.
Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 332 N.E.2d 863, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1975) (holding
that action of private individuals become subject of scrutiny for constitutional
violations when those individuals act as agent's of the government or when
government officials participate in those actions).
1 14 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 753, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The plain view doctrine is an
exception that permits the warrantless seizure of evidence when three
conditions are met. Id. at 465. Police may under certain circumstances seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant. Id. First, the officer must have a
prior justification for the intrusion that allowed him to view plainly the
evidence. Id. at 466. Second, the discovery of the evidence must be
inadvertent. Id. at 469. Third, it must be "immediately apparent to the
police that they have [incriminating] evidence before them." Id. at 466. See
also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (permitting the
warrantless seizure of objects viewed in plain sight when the incriminating
character of the object is immediately apparent and the authorities are lawfully
situated to both make the viewing and access the object); People v. Diaz, 81
N.Y.2d 106, 109, 612 N.E.2d 298, 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (1993)
(stating that "[i] t is fundamental that warrantless searches and seizures are per
se unreasonable unless they fall into one of the acknowledged exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.").
115 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 758, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The court held
that "any police officer from a foreign state, who is not in close pursuit of a
suspect and who effects an extraterritorial arrest of that suspect in New York
State, is a private citizen for the purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis."
Id. Moreover, the court determined that the New Jersey police officers were
not acting as agents of New York State under the Fourth Amendment
reasoning that the "New York City police officers did not participate in the
defendant's arrest and the acquisition of the contraband, nor were they even in
the defendant's apartment during the defendant's arrest and the search for and
seizure of the alleged narcotics." Id. at 758-59, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
Accordingly, the court held that there was no state action under the Fourth
Amendment since the New York State police officers did not participate in the
apprehension of the defendant and acquisition of the narcotics. Id. at 759, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 666 (citations omitted).
1998 1183
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coercing defendant from his home and arresting him."' 1 6
Accordingly, the New Jersey police officers conduct triggered
application of the Fourth Amendment. 17  Based upon the
principles enunciated in Payton v. New York,"' the LaFontaine
lower court determined that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against police officers making warrantless and non-consensual
entry into a home to affect an arrest and search the premises was
violated if the New Jersey police officers entered the defendant's
home and seized the narcotics without a warrant." 9  Since
defendant did not consent to the New Jersey police officer's entry
into his home, "only an arrest pursuant to a warrant validates the
defendant's seizure." 120 Therefore, the court determined that the
New Jersey warrant was invalid because it had no effect outside
of New Jersey's borders.12 ' However, the court found that the
federal warrant served to validate the arrest of the defendant since
the type of federal warrant issued in this case may be executed
116 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The court applied
the "under color of authority" principle to determine that the New Jersey
police officers, acting as police officers, not private citizens, exerted the
powers of their office by announcing that they were the police before entering
defendant's home, explaining to the defendant that they had a warrant for his
arrest, and administering Miranda warnings to him. LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d
at 762, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
17 Id.
118 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, police officers, acting on probable
cause that the defendant murdered a manager of a gas station, entered the
defendant's home forcibly without an warrant and seized a .30 caliber shell
casing which the prosecution sought to introduce at trial. Id. at 576-77. The
Court deemed the arrest of the defendant to be in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. Id. at 602-03. Consequently, the Supreme Court found
the New York statute authorizing police officers to enter a suspect's home in
order to procure an arrest, to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment and
thus, unconstitutional. Id. at 576. The Court held "that the Fourth
Amendment... prohibits the police from making a warrantless and non-
consensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony
arrest." Id.
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anywhere in the United States.'2 The court further held that the
evidence seized by the police officers was obtained pursuant to
the "in plain view" doctrine and properly seized without a
warrant. 1
23
The Appellate Division, First Department, began its analysis by
stating that the police officers could not execute the New Jersey
arrest warrant in New York State.124 In reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that police officers do not have the power to
arrest individuals outside of their geographical jurisdiction."5
Likewise, an arrest warrant issued from one state has no validity
outside that state and cannot as such be executed in another
state. 12 However, under well established federal and state
principles of law, a police officer acting outside his jurisdiction
has the power to make a lawful citizen's arrest.' Hence, the
12 Id. at 764, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 668. See FED. R. CRum. P. 4(d)(2). This
section provides: "The warrant may be executed or the summons may be
served at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
123 LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d at 766, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 670. (citing Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
124 People v. LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d 93, 96, 664 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (1st
Dep't 1997).
125 Id. at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589-90 (citing Illinois v. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d
539 (1992) (recognizing the common law rule that "police officers had no
authority to arrest a defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entity
which appointed them to their office"); Conn. v. Stevens, 603 A.2d 1203,
1207 (1992) (recognizing the general rule that "police officers acting outside
their jurisdiction do not act in their official capacity, nor do they have official
power to arrest")). See N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 140.55 (McKinney 1997)
(providing an exception to this rule by permitting a police officer from another
State who is in close pursuit of a suspect, to arrest that suspect in this State).
126 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 96, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (citing Colorado v.
Hamilton 666 P.2d 152 (1983)).
127 Id. (citing Illinois v. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d 539 (1992); Conn. v. Stevens,
603 A.2d 1203 (1992); Florida v. Phoenix, 428 So.2d 262 (1982)). See also
United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that
defendant's arrest by federal narcotic agents was lawful without a warrant
under the New York statute which permits an arrest of another by a private
person when the person arrested has committed a felony); United States v.
Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that agents lacked authority under
law to arrest defendant without a warrant absent reasonable cause to believe
1998 1185
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court addressed the question of whether or not the arrest of the
defendant in New York by New Jersey officers was valid as a
citizens arrest.12 Since this was an issue of first impression in
New York, the court relied on authority from other states.
129
While some courts have held that a police officer acting under the
"color of authority" outside his jurisdiction, loses his status as a
private person,130 the Appellate Division adopted the view that a
police officer's extraterritorial arrest is not invalidated unless
"the police officer uses the power of his office to obtain evidence
not available to private citizens.""3
In Illinois v. Lahr,13 2 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
invalidation of an arrest made by a police officer who utilized a
radar gun to detect speeders outside of the officer's jurisdiction.'33
The court reasoned that the use of the radar gun by the officer
removed the arrest from the purview of a citizen's arrest because
citizens are not typically armed with radar guns."' Because the
police officer used the power of his office to obtain evidence
that the defendant was committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor in
their presence).
128 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 96, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 590. See N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 570.34 (McKinney 1997). This section provides in pertinent
part: "The arrest of a person in this state may be lawfully made also by any
police officer or a private persons, without a warrant, upon reasonable
information that the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with
a [felony]." Id.
129 People v. LaFontaine, 159 Misc. 2d 751, 757, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 665
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1993).
130 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 97, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 591. See Collins v.
Florida, 143 So.2d 700 (1962) (holding that officials acting outside their
jurisdiction are sustainable as acts of private citizens only if they are not acting
"under color of their office"); Commonwealth v. Troutman, 302 A.2d 430
(Pa. 1973) (holding that once a police officer invokes the power of the
township to make an arrest he can not preserve the legality of the arrest by
labeling his behavior a citizen's arrest).
131 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 97-98, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (citing Florida v.
Phoenix, 428 So.2d 262 (1982); Illinois v. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. 1992)).
132 589 N.E.2d 539 (I1l. 1992).
133 Lahr, 589 N.E.2d at 540.
134 Id. at 540-41.
1186 [Vol 14
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unavailable to the private citizen, the arrest did not qualify as a
citizen's arrest. 35
In Florida v. Phoenix,3 6 police officers effected an arrest while
outside the confines of their jurisdiction. 37 The police officers,
investigating a suspected smuggling operation outside their own
county, were in uniform and using marked police cars and an
aircraft to "tail" a suspect vehicle.1' The officers pursued the
defendant, stopped defendant's car, identified themselves as
police officers and arrested the occupants. 39 Subsequently, while
searching the defendant's car, the police officers found drugs
inside of the vehicle."4° The Florida Supreme Court held that an
extrajurisdictional arrest could be validated as a citizens arrest,
even though the police officers identified themselves as police and
used a marked car. 4' The court reasoned that "law enforcement
officials, when they are outside their jurisdiction, should not be
any less capable, by virtue of their position, of making a felony
arrest than a private citizen... neither should they have any
greater power of arrest outside their jurisdiction than private
citizens." 1
42
Similarly, in LaFontaine, there were no specific law
enforcement instruments utilized which would not ordinarily have
been used by private individuals. 43  The police officers simply
135 Id.
136 428 So.2d 262 (1982).
17 Phoenix, 455 So.2d at 1024.
138 Id.
13 9 Id. at 1024-25.
140 Id. Defendants were charged with the crime of trafficking in marijuana.
Id. at 1025. They moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the stop and
search of their vehicle by officers outside of their jurisdiction, was unlawful
because the officers acted "under color of office." Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. (citations omitted).
143 People v. LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d 93, 98, 664 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591 (1st
Dep't 1997). The court stated that "[o]ther than identifying themselves as
police, the New Jersey officers did nothing that could not have been done by
any private person." Id.
1998 1187
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knocked on the defendant's door and identified themselves as
police.'" As the court opined, the officers "simply made a
warrantless arrest of a fleeing felon on a fire escape." 145 Hence,
the court declined to reach the conclusion that the New Jersey
officers had acted as police officers, rather, the court determined
that the officers acted in the capacity of private citizens. 46
Nevertheless, defendant argued that even if the court were to
determine that the police officers were acting as private citizens,
the arrest was nonetheless unlawful.147 Relying on cases which
hold that private citizens are not permitted to make arrests inside
a private apartment, defendant argued that he had been coerced
out of his apartment and therefore constructively arrested without
a warrant inside his apartment. 4 1 The court rejected this
argument, distinguishing the cases relied on by the defendant as
involving situations where the defendant was surrounded by many
police officers who had their guns drawn.149  Such a set of
circumstances was clearly not present in this case as the
defendant's exit from his apartment was voluntary and not a
function of official police coercion. 1
50
The court continued its analysis by holding that even if the
police officers were not acting in the capacity of private citizens,
the evidence should still not be suppressed. 5' The court reasoned
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. Although the police officers acted in their law enforcement capacity
when they obtained the cooperation of the New York City police and when
they obtained the arrest warrants, they did not gain evidence solely due to their
official status as police officers. Id. Moreover, it is uncontested that the
evidence was in plain view to everyone inside the defendant's apartment. Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. (citing United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Morgan,
743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984)).
149 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 98-99, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
150 Id. at 99, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592. The actual arrest of the defendant took
place on the fire escape, not in the apartment. Id. However, the defendant
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that "violations of statutory requirements in criminal prosecutions
will result in the sanction of suppression of evidence only where a
constitutionally protected right is implicated." " The court found
that there was no such constitutionally protected right violated
here because the Fourth Amendment, which sets forth the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure, does not mandate a corresponding right to be free from
arrest by statutorily unauthorized individuals.1
5 1
In People v. Walls,1s4 the New York Court of Appeals also
refused to suppress evidence notwithstanding the police officers
violation of a State's statutory requirements. 51 In Walls, two
New York City police officers pursued and arrested the
defendants on the New Jersey side of the Lincoln Tunnel. 5 ' The
defendants argued, inter alia, that the evidence seized from them
should be suppressed as the New York police officers failed to
comply with a New Jersey statute which required prompt
arraignment before a New Jersey magistrate and an extradition
proceeding in New Jersey." The court rejected this challenge,
holding that the arrest and search were valid as the police officers
had acted in good faith and did not knowingly or intentionally
disregard the law.'
Relying on its decision in Walls, the New York Court of
Appeals, in People v. Sampson,'59 refused to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of statutory guidelines. iW In Sampson, New
York police officers failed to follow statutory guidelines when
152 Id. (citing Charles Q. v. Constantine, 85 N.Y.2d 571, 650 N.E.2d 839,
626 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1995); People v. Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711, 587 N.E.2d
255, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1991)).
153 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
154 35 N.Y.2d 419, 321 N.E.2d 875, 363 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1974).
155 Id. at 424, 321 N.E.2d at 876, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
156 Id. at 423-24, 321 N.E.2d at 876, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
157 Id. at 424, 321 N.E.2d at 876, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
158 Id.
159 73 N.Y.2d 908, 536 N.E.2d 617, 539 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1989).
160 Id. at 910, 536 N.E.2d at 618, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
11891998
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they arrested the defendant in Vermont."' The court denied
defendant's request to suppress evidence, holding that "any
violation of the statutory guidelines concerning arrests made out
of state, does not, in this case, call for suppression." 62
Similarly, in LaFontaine, the court determined that the only
possible violation by the New Jersey police officers was statutory
and not constitutional.' 63 As the Colorado Supreme Court stated
in Colorado v. Hamilton,164 a case cited in LaFontaine, the
"sanction of the exclusionary rule is designed to effectuate
guarantees against deprivation of constitutional rights" and
violations of statutory proscriptions against extraterritorial arrests
"are not per se violations of constitutionally protected rights." '65
Finally, the LaFontaine court found that there was no viable
claim that the police officers lacked probable cause when they
arrested defendant, because the police officers possessed valid
161 Id. Defendant, a resident of Vermont, was a suspect in a murder that
took place in New York. Id. at 908-09, 536 N.E.2d at 617, 539 N.Y.S.2d at
288. When the New York City police officers went to question the defendant
in Vermont, he confessed to the murders. Id. at 909, 536 N.E.2d at 617, 539
N.Y.S.2d at 288. Thereafter, the police officers arrested the defendant in
Vermont. Id. However, subsequent to his confession, the defendant made
additional incriminating statements. Id. The defendant argued that the
statements made following his initial confession were products of an illegal
detention by the police officers. Id. at 909, 536 N.E.2d at 618, 539 N.Y.S.2d
at 288-89.
162 Id. at 910, 536 N.E.2d at 618, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
163 People v. LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d 93, 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d 587, 592-93
(lst Dep't 1997). "At worst, the New Jersey officers violated procedural
statutes that confer the power to arrest and execute warrants on a specific class
of persons." Id. at 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
164 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983). In Hamilton, police officers from the Town
of Golden executed an arrest warrant upon the defendant inside a Bank located
in Denver, Colorado, which was located outside of the territorial limits of their
authority. Id. at 153. The court held that the arrest was "not so unreasonable
as to violate defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures." Id. at 157.
165 Id. at 156 (citations omitted).
1190 [V/ol 14
13
et al.: Search and Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
New Jersey and Federal warrants for the defendant's arrest. 6
Therefore, the court concluded that the "Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
exclusionary rule remedy," were not applicable here.6'
The federal and state positions regarding the propriety of police
officers executing arrest warrants outside of their jurisdictions are
analogous. In fact, the New York court specifically relied upon
cases from both federal and other state courts to support the
proposition that under certain circumstances, a police officer may
make an arrest in another jurisdiction." The court in LaFontaine
offered two solutions to the problem. Solution one likens the
police officer to a private citizen and as such removes the
officer's conduct from the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 6 9
Solution two analyzes whether the police officer's actions, as
opposed to his identity, are consistent with the tenets of the
Fourth Amendment. 7° Therefore, if a New Jersey police officer
executes an arrest in New York pursuant to a valid New Jersey
166 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592. See also
Colorado v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983) (concluding that even
though the arrest of the defendant was unauthorized, the presence of the
warrant established the probable cause for the arrest).
167 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 100, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592. (citing North
Carolina v. Mangum, 226 S.E.2d 852 (1976)). The dissent opined that from
the outset of this case the New Jersey officers were wholly without jurisdiction
to effect the arrest of the defendant in the State of New York. Id. at 108-09,
664 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (Tom, J., dissenting). Therefore, since the jurisdictional
predicate for the arrest was invalid, any evidence seized incident to such arrest
must be suppressed as a matter of law. Id. (Tom, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the dissent stated that the New York statute that limits the
authority to effect an arrest to duly sworn New York officers, is predicated
upon the constitutional principle that a state has the authority to effect an
arrest. Id. at 107-08, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (Tom, J., dissenting). Since the
New Jersey police officers were acting outside the scope of authority to arrest
individuals in New York City, the arrest must be held invalid. Id. (Tom, I.,
dissenting).
168 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 99, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93.
169 Id. at 96, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
170 Id. at 97, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
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arrest warrant and in so doing finds narcotics in plain view, his
conduct will be evaluated, and not his identity. 7'
People v. Smith 72
(decided May 15, 1997)
Defendant, William Smith, also known as Frank Mills, was
convicted after a jury trial in the Supreme Court, New York
County, of grand larceny in the third and fourth degree, fourteen
counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree,
and criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second
degree.1 73 Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of three
and one-half years to seven years on the third degree grand
larceny conviction, two years to four years on the fourth degree
grand larceny and the criminal possession of a forged instrument
in the second degree convictions, and one and one-half years to
three years on each of the offering a false instrument for filing in
the first degree convictions. 171
Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his right
to be free from illegal search and seizure under the Federal'" and
171 Id. at 98, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
172 658 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 90 N.Y.2d 911, 686
N.E.2d 232, 663 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1997).
173 Id. at 260. The New York statute for grand larceny in the third and
fourth degree is embodied in New York Penal Law §§ 155.35 and 155.30
respectively. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.35, 155.30 (McKinney 1996). The
New York statute for offering a false instrument in the first degree is embodied
in the New York Penal Law § 175.35. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.35
(McKinney 1996). The New York statute for criminal possession of a forged
instrument in the second degree is embodied in the New York Penal Law
§ 170.25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.25 (McKinney 1996).
174 Smith, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
175 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
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